As the humanitarian health response industry grows, there is a need for technical health expertise that can build an evidence base around outcome measures and raise the quality and accountability of the health relief response. We propose the formation of technical support units (TSUs), entities of health expertise institutionalized within humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which will bridge the gap between the demand for evidencebased, humanitarian programming and the field capacity to accomplish it. With the input of major humanitarian NGOs and donors, this paper discusses the attributes and capacities of TSUs; and the mechanisms for creating and enhancing TSUs within the NGO management structure. 
Introduction
The humanitarian aid industry has expanded in its scope, practice, and monetary outlays, and in the number of organizations involved in relief activities. Recently, humanitarian actors involved in relief operations functioned independently with little coordination and no professional oversight from those funding them (the donors) or from those theoretically benefiting from their assistance (the clients). This was evident, especially in the health sector. The rapid deployment and lack of coordination among the implementing health agencies serving distressed populations provoked a series of missteps culminating in the soaring crude mortality rates from epidemic diarrhea in the massive refugee camps in Goma, Zaire in 1994. 1, 2 This milestone event prompted a major effort in the humanitarian non-governmental organization (NGO) community to initiate a number of self-policing efforts. The result has been a series of consensual guidelines and standards that inform strategic programming for populations in need and bring a level of professional conduct and accountability to the humanitarian relief field. The Sphere Project, the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP), the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the Mèdicins sans Frontiéres (MSF) handbook on refugee health, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook are all such examples. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Donor agencies have welcomed this effort at professionalization and, at the same time, driven the process without a full understanding of the use and utility of field data. The buzz-phrase, "evidence-based", borrowed from the field of medicine, has been adopted quickly by donors, resulting in a demand for measures of the impacts of health programs and proofs of accountability to an accepted set of standards. Quantitative and qualitative indicators subsequently were developed. For instance, the United States and Canadian governmental development agencies initiated the use of Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART)-aimed at bringing some level of conformity among all humanitarian stakeholders around mortality and nutritional benchmarks as well as the methods for measuring those benchmarks. 8 
Non-Governmental Organizational Health Operations
What has evolved is a gap between concept and practice. Generally, it is accepted that the recipients of humanitarian assistance benefit from programs that monitor quality and outcomes, although this assumption has not been studied prospectively or retrospectively. The next logical step in professionalizing humanitarian practice is understanding how the growing insistence for quality assurance in humanitarian health operations by both donor and NGO actors be accomplished. One mechanism by which this can occur is the use of technical support for field operations. Technical support entails the deployment of formalized health expertise that informs and guides NGO humanitarian health operations. But, there is little consensus regarding the skill set needed for technical support personnel nor a precedent model that guides how a technical support unit (TSU) can function in the humanitarian health sector. Additionally, it is unclear how donors and NGOs develop a common understanding of TSUs and utilize them to fill the gap between the ideals of standards and actual field practice. This paper is a derivation of a Working Group discussion convened at the Humanitarian Health Conference (HHC) in Hanover, New Hampshire USA on the implications of TSUs and their role in humanitarian relief. The paper was the result of moderated discussions among major field NGOs and donors, and (1) describes the ideal attributes and capacities of technical support entities in the health sector; (2) discusses the challenges of funding, implementing, and operationalizing TSUs; and (3) affirms the proposition that health technical support capabilities are necessary for assuring best practices and accountability in humanitarian health operations of the future.
Attributes and Capacities of a Technical Support Unit
The functions of a group of technical health experts in humanitarian operations generally include overseeing the implementation of health programs and developing the evidence base through systematic data collection, analysis, and interpretation of the when, where, how, for how long, and to what effect questions that inevitably surround those programs. The Working Group implemented attributes and capacities of technical support that were essential to these functions based on their respective field and institutional experiences.
The attributes of TSUs are defined as ideal characteristics desired by organizations and donors. The capacity of TSUs can be articulated by what is needed to integrate TSUs within an organization's operational framework.
Since not all of the humanitarian NGOs have health as a major focus, and others may have focal health niches (e.g., reproductive health, mental health, HIV/AIDS, sex-and gender-based violence, inpatient care), various examples of how technical expertise is integrated into an organization's operational programming emerged. Attributes link conceptually with capacities, as illustrated in Figure 1 ; this section discusses them similarly. Several models for integrating technical expertise into an organization's operational programming can be described. Technical support units can be created and resourced internally to create organizational technical capacity, or such expertise can be outsourced to a professional organization or consultant.
In all of these cases, the technical understanding of the specific programs, the distribution of the client population, and mechanisms for program monitoring and evaluation is imperative for program quality. This requires a foundational knowledge of crisis epidemiology and technical attribut-es of the specific program. The technical health expert should reflexively visualize health or a specific health issue as a phenomenon that occurs in a population-the essence of public health-and not, as most health providers are trained, on a case-by-case basis. The technical health expert working as part of a TSU really is a public health provider that recognizes health issues as trends that occur within a population as it transitions from the emergency disaster phase to post-conflict/post-disaster and development phases. The application of quantifiable indicators-measured markers-may seem intuitive, but the knowledge and procedures for measurement and the timing of measurement and intervention rarely are translated to the field. This is the core function of TSUs. For example, the TSU will be responsible for interpreting the Sphere standards for health in the context of field operations and for coordinating with the UN health cluster and other health NGOs on best practices in any given intervention. Ultimately, the TSU will translate and interpret findings to a global audience of NGOs, multilaterals, and the population of interest.
Ideally, a TSU would have the capacity to deploy a cadre of health specialists to the field to address specific programmatic issues, either at program conception or as an ongoing evaluation. Team members would have specialists with health niche-specific expertise in core health components of relief, recovery, and development, and be deployed in the appropriate phase of the response matched with their experience. Technical support unit members likely would include epidemiologists, medical personnel with a public health background and population-based understanding of healthcare services and health systems, and experts in such core competencies as environmental health, child survival, reproductive health, and mental health. The TSU specialists should have had substantive exposure to field operations and have a field context of their respective health niche in order to be deployable. Technical support unit personnel will have had experience in technical coordination, collaboration, analysis, and knowledge/data sharing across NGOs, local and international, multilateral organizations, and governmental organizations.
In order for TSUs to be engaged throughout the intervention, they require a well-defined, clear-channeled access to field operations in real time. The dissociation that occurs between NGO headquarters and field operations can be profound and result in a relative disconnect between central policy and field-based programming. Two-way communication begins with the headquarters and field staff agreeing on common health priorities with significant input, if not direction, from the TSU. Practically speaking, the more a TSU provides direct input into policy and programming decisions, the more the headquarters-field communication gap is bridged. Africares, an NGO that supports humanitarian health relief in Africa, moves its technical personnel between headquarters and field. A technical unit operates on the same level as regional directors, and is engaged directly in program design and project development at each level. 9 As TSU activity moves from headquarters to field operations and back, it can play a crucial role in enhancing communication between central, regional, and field offices. For this to happen, the organization must maintain the integrity of feedback communications from field operations in order to adjust and re-evaluate health program objectives as they evolve and change. The classic example is the surveillance system that tracks communicable disease data, and may detect an acute outbreak that demands a rapid response. Or perhaps, changing security conditions in the area of operations may put the health of a population at risk and the lack of access to basic health services may precipitate outbreaks. Critical information must flow from field to headquarters. Likewise, health policy decisions at the headquarters need a clear conduit to the field. If the confinement of a refugee population becomes prolonged, the headquarters may need to redirect its focus to field efforts that prepare programs to manage chronic diseases. As the intervention evolves, the NGO benefits from having technical expertise in the decision-making process, helping craft an exit strategy, particularly if the NGO primarily works during emergencies, and seeks to hand off operations back to national actors or to a development NGO.
As the health TSU becomes integrated into the operational structure of the NGO, it should have access to the internal communications mechanism that allows for the dissemination of the agency's health policy and programming information and health knowledge transfer. Communication links to senior leadership, public affairs, and other specialized sectors that influence health (e.g., water and sanitation, food, protection, advocacy) will ensure that health data are processed, shared, and interpreted in a greater context and incorporated into the agency's overall response strategy. A robust internal communication mechanism also will enable timely and temporally critical health analyses to move quickly to appropriate targets within the organization, particularly when there is a clearly defined role for health data. For example. CARE International, a large NGO with a decentralized management structure, engaged its advocacy group at headquarters when their West Bank and Gaza country office completed a population study that revealed transient malnutrition due to Israeli closure policies. 10 Likewise, external communications networks to donors, multilaterals, international organizations, UN agencies, and specifically, international health databases such as the Centre for Research and Epidemiology in Disasters (CRED) and the World Health Organization's Health and Nutrition Tracking Service connect the NGO with the larger humanitarian health community, allowing its TSU a "place at the table" during the development and modification of best practice guidelines, key indicators, and databases.
Linking technical support to external consultants allows organizations to improve their technical support without maintaining an in-house unit. Non-governmental organizations are beginning to turn to academic institutions for assistance in designing population-based studies to enhance their technical expertise and analytical capability, a trend that likely will increase in the future. By adapting and improving quantitative and qualitative methods honed by academia to field applications, health NGOs can focus design, data collection, and analysis on their policy and practice. Naturally, TSUs would be the point of partnership between an NGO and an academic institution. This symbiosis brings added credibility to a NGO seeking to establish its role in building the evidence base in humanitarian health operations. For the academic institution, the NGO provides field operational capacity and a crucial, logistical, and contextual link to the field. Adapting methods to the field requires the local and context-specific knowledge incountry NGOs have acquired. The NGO field offices can familiarize technical support expertise with its field personnel and the skills and educational capacity of local hires. They also will have a better sense of the reliability and credibility of the available data sources. Working together, they can apply validated methods, perfect the timing of measurements, build the standardized data sets valuable to multilateral decision-makers, respond to changing indicators through the phases of a disaster or complex emergency, and work to narrow the gap between concept and practice, improving the precision of prevention, mitigation, and response in the process.
In practice, NGO management supports science that builds programs and guides policy. 11 By providing the logistical foundation, and more importantly, an institutional commitment, a NGO either can maintain a TSU with the built-in, on-the-ground capacity and/or the freedom to: (1) outsource as needed to design an evaluation for a health program or an assessment for a health problem within a population in pre-, mid-, or post-conflict humanitarian operations; (2) perform an analysis that answers specific program or policy questions; and (3) interpret data in such a way that they add to a global evidence base, and in the process, raise the stature of the NGO within the health sector.
Finally, TSUs work within an ethical framework, recognizing the rights of clients to: (1) participate in the development of health programs and health research; (2) ensure proper informed consent; (3) adhere to principles of beneficence, confidentiality, and respondent safety; and (4) disseminate information to all who need to know. 12 Unfortunately, NGOs do not always follow utilitarian principles-health data that benefit the common good often are kept proprietary and a policy of open access is not followed. Aside from legitimate security reasons (e.g., when divulging information may place respondents at greater security risk and vulnerability), TSUs must responsibly interpret findings with a high regard for scientific objectivity, and do so for the sake of the greater humanitarian community. Technical support units have an important role in ensuring that NGO health programs are established and managed based on needs and best practices rather than such considerations as the unexamined wishes of donors or the preferences of individual personalities.
Challenges for Technical Support Units Funding Constraints
Funding issues remain the primary barrier for the full development and implementation of professional technical resources within organizations. Despite the recent demand for data driven by the extra-and intra-organizational need for evidence-based decision making, the challenges to meet those demands remain, and organizations receive little or no funding for technical support. Organizations continue to face constraints in creating sustainable TSUs due to lack of donor funding, the lack of organizational will, and the lack of expertise available to gather, analyze, and utilize meaningful data for organizational decision-making.
Only recently has the donor community come to understand the need for an evidence-based approach that has a role in targeting resources and accounting for their effectiveness.The Good Humanitarian Donor Initiative (GHD), a forum of international major donors established in 2003 to improve donor practices in humanitarian crises, state in their "Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship" document, to "request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action…" 13 While the awareness for having an evidence base in humanitarian relief that can guide best practices and build accountability is becoming apparent among donors, the translation of that into practice through targeted funding and real coordination still lags. 14 This demand-support gap likely is due to a lack of understanding of "monitoring" and "evaluation" on the part of donors and relief organizations. Whereas "monitoring" charts the quantitative outputs of a given program, the more nebulous "evaluation" really should systematically measure the positive, neutral, and negative effects of the objectives of a program. Annual NGO reports generally are rife with programming success stories. However, numbers of condoms distributed, numbers of refugee participants in a personal hygiene educational program, or metric tons of grain distributed does not equate to cases of HIV prevented, incidence rates of diarrheal disease reduced, or the improved nutritional status of children, respectively, without a means to measure these outcomes. The dependence on process indicators, rather than outcome indicators, perpetuates that lack of understanding of real program effectiveness. By displaying a lack of priority in funding evidence-based approaches to programming, donors run the risk of creating disincentives for implementing partners to develop and utilize technical support services for program inception and maintenance.
Implementing Constraints
Field-based "research" often intimidates field staff. Field project managers and on up the chain of command are reticent about being scrutinized on performance, particularly in an unwieldy and insecure environment. For them, the objective quantification of success in project delivery can be a double-edged sword. On one hand, the ability to measure a program or project's effectiveness can enhance an NGO's profile and add valuable information to the global knowledge base of humanitarian response. Within an organization, however, this carries a certain level of risk. Field workers and program managers may feel a sense of job insecurity with the scientific reporting of the impact of their health program. This may lead to intra-organizational tension in which TSU personnel and their objectives are perceived by operations personnel as more adversarial than allied. Also, there is the temptation to present robust health data in a skewed or altered manner in an effort to show headquarters (and ultimately donors) how program objectives are being met, despite what, in reality, may be continued ineffective delivery of care to clients. This is tempting, especially for programs whose future funding is tied to a continued, perceived, population need. Therefore, TSUs can affect the direction in which a humanitarian health program may progress, directly influencing the success of obtaining funding for the continuation of a given program, or any other future programming for that matter.
The majority of evidence-based humanitarian health responses have been in the form of quantitative analysis, i.e., crude mortality rates, weight for height ratios to determine acute malnutrition, incidence of various communicable diseases. For most health NGOs, the appropriate collection and analysis of this type of data have been a Herculean task-and evidence suggests that for an agreement on a few basic quantitative health indicators, the methods to obtain those data remain of questionable quality. 15 Qualitative impact measures are even more mystifying to humanitarian relief personnel. How does one measure the target population's beliefs, perceptions, and feelings about a humanitarian program, its appropriateness, its cultural nuances? How can one gauge behavioral changes as a marker of program success? The need for applying qualitative research in humanitarian effectiveness has gained ground only recently; its utility as an agent of guiding program development is slowly becoming clear. Bolton et al further elaborate this need. 16 Indeed, the universally accepted Sphere Standards and HAP call for the inclusion of beneficiaries and clients in the evaluation of humanitarian response-qualitative methods are most apt for this. 3 This is accomplished rarely (the Indian Ocean Tsunami response is a notable exception); 17 most NGOs do not have the technical expertise for this type of study. Technical support units that include quantitative and qualitative expertise-broad and diverse skill sets-offer a humanitarian organization powerful capacity and place them in the forefront of evidence-based humanitarian health programming.
A third implementing constraint concerns the discrepancy between the plethora of emergency phase indicators and the lack of similar indicators during transitional and post-emergency phases. Current emergency phase indicators are composed of both expert consensus opinion and, to a lesser degree, on the evidence base, (e.g., scientific/epidemiologic methods). However, there is extremely limited information (and no body of standardized indicators) on transition populations and post-crisis phase populations to appraise a program's performance in relief to development transitions appropriately. The temptation during transitional periods is to revert back to what is known, (i.e., the vast number of emergency phase indicators). This regression can be compounded further by donor and intra-organizational demands for data without regard to context or population characteristics. Cultural factors, governmental policies, insecurity, and logistics all can confound the implementation of a well-conceived humanitarian program. The opportunity is wide-open for TSUs to establish an evidence-base in post-crisis settings and define markers from relief to development, controlling for the effects of given contexts.
Lastly, no coordinating body among humanitarian agencies exists to ensure that technical health standards of response are being met, or that TSU personnel use appropriate methods in the study design, data collection, and data analysis of a humanitarian program in a given context. The fact that the humanitarian community has been able to come together to endorse and apply the Sphere Standards in technically specific sectors is a remarkable feat; the next logical step would be the creation of a universally endorsed body to review and critique TSU deliverables in terms of design, methodology, analysis, interpretation, and overall quality and appropriateness. Whether the UN Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) health cluster eventually will have the mandate, resources, and authority for this level of technical accountability during a humanitarian response remains to be seen.
Operationalizing Constraints
Getting technical support expertise with humanitarian experience on-the-ground in a timely manner for the length of time necessary presents operational challenges within the humanitarian organization. Human resource departments of even the largest humanitarian NGOs struggle to maintain adequate numbers of qualified personnel in the field during a crisis-when the crisis becomes protracted, this even is more difficult. 18 High turnover rates of field personnel, an endemic problem in humanitarian relief, can result in an uneven flow of technical competence and hinder the ability of TSUs to implement quality assurance and durable, successful programs, particularly if the succession of technical expertise is not all "on the same page". In this instance, the methods and quality of data collection may reflect the particular bias of whoever is taking the technical lead at any given time. When combined with a general lack of technical expertise, particularly in quick response situations, a humanitarian health program may lack focus and direction.
Gathering systematic data during humanitarian crises is an obvious challenge to operationalizing a TSU, even when the technical expertise is available for the implementing organization. Besides the ubiquitous problems of insecurity and access, formats may vary; cost may prohibit a population-based study, especially if it involves keeping expatriates in the field for prolonged periods of time; and field personnel may feel that their time is better spent with the "nuts and bolts" of keeping a program functioning than running here and there gathering data. Data feedback from inaccurate monitoring mechanisms and a lack of data feedback from clients and key informants will cause imprecision in the analysis of indicators, and subsequently impair the ability of humanitarian programs to adapt, move forward, and respond to the demands of the population.
Ensuring that TSU field activity is needs driven and not policy driven (either from the senior leadership of a NGO or the donor's acquiescence to national government policy) can strain relations between headquarters and field. Whereas TSU personnel approach a program study with lines of communication up the chain of command to senior technical and planning personnel at headquarters. Field input should be streamlined, and the use of technology adapted to field realities. Local data collectors should have straightforward tools for data management, and ready access to secure, Web-based portals that communicate with central databases. Hand-held devices capable of "beaming" data to headquarters, wiki sites, and virtual emergency operations centers are examples of such portals. To minimize the chances of inaccurate data collection and systemic error in data collection methods, field personnel should have access to TSU expertise on a 24-hour, sevendays/week basis; the TSU can function as a global technical health support team with a dedicated technical duty officer who could be based anywhere since s/he would be available digitally. A Web-based repository of best-practice guidelines on appropriate indicators and data collection measurement and methods, as well as methods to utilize technical data resources (e.g., where to get baseline dataDemographic and Health Surveys and other national surveys, census information) readily can be available to field personnel who are the most attuned to contextual influences on program performance. A centrally located TSU member, familiarized with data management software applications, should be available for immediate analysis and dissemination of that analysis to key stakeholders.
Non-governmental organizations working across sectors can benefit from linked data (e.g., food distribution with nutrition, water and sanitation with communicable disease surveillance) and mechanisms for data sharing and common collection platforms should be explored. This will require dismantling the proprietary culture of humanitarian NGOs that encourages program competition over cooperation. International efforts such as the IASC health cluster mechanism can instill a culture of data-sharing and cross-sectoral analysis for the global goal of improving performance and developing the humanitarian evidence base. 22 Build Partnerships Technical units need a platform for discussion and a forum for introducing the kinds of innovations mentioned above. Humanitarian health NGO partnerships with academic institutions is one obvious synergistic relationship-however, a myriad of others have potential for TSUs working within NGOs, depending on the objectives of the NGO and the respective benefits of partnering with other institutions with differing capacities (Figure 2 ). This is not to say that every humanitarian NGO needs its own health TSU if a technical support team with applied public health experience in humanitarian crises from academic, private, or research institutions can be outsourced. Given that the humanitarian relief community is relatively small, particularly in the health sector, traditionally non-health NGOs easily can network for the type of health expertise they need and configure a team that matches their program objectives.
Models of Technical Support within NGOs
Technical support personnel may be placed in various levels of the organizational framework of an NGO with varydecided objectivity, headquarters personnel may have agendas crafted from outside influences not readily apparent to technical field personnel. Advocacy and technical objectives may conflict. Needs for technical capacity may arise in areas for which the NGO was not originally funded. An organizational communications structure of transparency and trust is essential for a TSU to operate effectively through these dilemmas.
Creating and Enhancing Technical Support Units
The Working Group, which comprised representatives from NGOs and academia, after putting forward these challenges, proposed a variety of TSU models, and defined future steps in developing the TSU concept, taking attributes, capacities, and constraints into consideration.
Three focal areas were identified as critical next steps to creating TSUs, including: (1) advocating for donor support; (2) managing health information through digital and real-time mechanisms; and (3) building intra-organizational and inter-organizational partnerships that would sustain TSUs and enhance the flexibility and diversity of their skill sets.
regional and field levels where the bulk of health personnel work. While expatriates may occupy senior level positions at the headquarters, the long-term emphasis is on training and capacity building for regional and local staff. Mèdicins sans Frontiéres, a physician-run NGO, updates its regional and field health personnel on evidence-based data and its applications in health programming at their annual scientific assembly. The International Rescue Committee (IRC), another large humanitarian health NGO, has senior technical personnel centralized at headquarters who provide overall guidance on indicators and study design, technical capacity building, and technical backstopping to field health teams.
Non-governmental organization "B" has health as an area of interest but not significantly more so than other large humanitarian sectors; senior technical health officers are headquarters-based, but not included in the executive decisionmaking apparatus of the organization. Because its staffing is leaner, it does not have multiple levels of health personnel (i.e., regional health officers) but rather manage health programming directly at the field level where most of their health staff work. A communications link from field to headquarters exists, but can be tenuous when the health program expands beyond the managerial capacity at headquarters. ing degrees of integration and levels of centralization. A matrix frame that graphically represents the possible distribution of technical health staff within a NGO, their level of integration within the organization, and the degree of centralization of management and its relationship to senior technical managers within the organization is illustrated in Figure 3 . The area graphed for each model represents relative numbers of staff involved in health activities.
Non-governmental organizations with a more decentralized managerial framework may have a few senior technical staff at headquarters with larger numbers of technical personnel in regional and field offices working alongside other regional and field managers. For example, NGO "A" has a major focus in the humanitarian health sector with technical health personnel highly integrated at all levels of decision-making. Such models, though decentralized, may have a chain of command with varying levels of autonomy for field managers. Significant numbers of technical staff at all levels of the organization create built-in accountability and opportunities for fixed two-way communications between headquarters and the field. Health program guidelines may be drafted at the headquarters level-where senior technical officers are brought into the strategic planning of the organization-then, readily translated to the programming and to do so within a management structure that brings the evidence-base to the broader organization's decision-making. Organizations that seek to improve the availability of technical resources for their field operations may take a number of steps to evaluate the need for technical support and develop the capacity for serving those needs. These steps likely will include: 1. Defining ongoing technical needs-An organizational inventory of program needs and technical needs will assist in revealing the specific technical capacity necessary, such as curative health programming, communicable disease management, surveillance systems, and 2. Defining and evaluating the models of technical participation-The technical unit must function within the organizational structure and within the organizational culture in such a manner that effective health programming occurs. In establishing TSUs, NGOs will need to take into account the attributes, capacities, and constraints of building technical support for humanitarian health operations. In this way, organizations can develop the capacity and structure for technical support within their operations and continue to move humanitarian intervention toward a true, evidence-based pursuit.
Non-governmental organizations in which health is but one (often small) sector of involvement and are highly decentralized (field officers have significant autonomy and are responsible for their own funding) often outsource or partner when needing technical health assistance. An example is NGO "C" that has a decentralized structure such that field leadership seeks technical assistance from outside for a health program in its field portfolio. Outsourced personnel serve an advisory role to headquarters which may use health outcomes data for decisionmaking as needed.
The Working Group acknowledged that no universal model embodies the ideals described earlier, however, the integration-centralization matrix (Figure 1 ) provides an illustrative tool for describing the many ways technical health support is and can be incorporated into the NGO's management structure.
Future Steps
As evidence-based programming becomes the norm in the process of humanitarian health professionalization, NGOs working in the humanitarian health sector are exploring ways to create TSUs that raise the humanitarian health evidence base in their efforts to improve humanitarian health
